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I will argue that Regan's case for the 
strong animal rights position is unpersuasive 
and that this position entails consequences 
which a reasonable person cannot accept. I 
do not deny that some non-htman animals have 
rroral rights; indeed, I would extend the 
scope of the rights claim to include all 
sentient animals, that is, all those capable 
of having experiences, including experiences 
of pleasure or satisfaction and pain, suffer-
ing, or frustration. [3] However, I do not 
think that the moral rights of most non-htunan 
animals are identical in strength to those of 
persons. [4] The rights of rrost non-htunan 
animals may be overridden in circumstances 
which would not justify overriding the rights 
of persons. There are, for instance, compel-
ling realities which sometimes require that 
we kill animals for reasons which could not 
justify the killing of persons. I will call 
this view "the weak animal rights" position, 
even though it ascribes rights to a wider 
range of animals than does the strong animal 
rights position. 
I will begin by summar~z~ng Regan's case 
for the strong animal rights position and 
noting two problems with it. Next, I will 
explore some consequences of the strong ani-
mal rights position which I think are unac-
ceptable. Finally, I will outline the case 
for the weak animal rights position. 
Regan's Case 
Regan's argument moves through three 
stages. First, he argues that normal, mature 
marmnals are not only sentient but have other 
mental capacities, as well. These include 
the capacities for eIOOtion, memory, belief, 
desire, the use of general concepts, inten-
tional action, a sense of the future, and 
some degree of self-awareness. Creatures 
with such capacities are said to be subjects-
of-a-life. They are not only alive in the 
biological sense but have a psychological 
identity over time and an existence which can 
go better or worse for them. Thus, they can 
be harmed or benefitted. These are plausible 
claims, and well defended. One of the 
strongest parts of the book is the re1:llttal 
of philosofbers, such as R. G. Frey, who 
object to the application of such mentalistic 
terms to creatures that do not use a htunan-
style language.[S] The second and third 
stages of the argument are more problematic. 
subjects-of-a-life have inherent value. His 
concept of inherent value grows out of his 
opposition to utilitarianism. Utilitarian 
rroral theory, he says, treats individuals as 
"mere receptacles" for rrorally significant 
value, in that harm to one individual may be 
justified by the production of a greater net 
benefit to other individuals. In opposition 
to this, he holds that subjects-of-a-life 
have a value independent of both the value 
they may place upon their lives or experien-
ces and the value others may place upon them. 
Inherent value, Regan argues, does not 
come in degrees. To hold that some individu-
als have more inherent value than others is 
to adopt a "perfectionist" theory, i.e., one 
which assigns different moral worth to indi-
viduals according to how well they are 
thought to exemplify sane virtue(s), such as 
intelligence or moral autonomy. Perfection-
ist theories have been used, at least since 
the time of Aristotle, to rationalize such 
injustices as slavery and male domination, as 
well as the unrestrained exploitation of 
animals. Regan argues that if we reject 
these injustices, then we must also reject 
perfectionism and conclude that all subjects-
of-a-life have equal inherent value. Moral 
agents have no rrore inherent value than moral 
patients, i.e., subjects-of-a-life who are 
not rrorally responsible for their actions. 
In the third phase of the argument, 
Regan uses the thesis of equal inherent value 
to derive strong moral rights for all sub-
jects-of-a-life. This thesis underlies the 
Respect Principle, which forbids us to treat 
beings who have inherent value as mere recep-, 
tacles, i.e., mere means to the production of 
the greatest overall good. This principle, 
in turn, underlies the Harm Principle, which 
says that we have a direct prima facie duty 
not to harm beings who have inherent value. 
Together, these principles give rise to moral 
rights. Rights are defined as valid claims, 
claims to certain goods and against certain 
beings, i.e., rroral agents. Moral rights 
generate duties not only to refrain from 
inflicting hann upon beings with inherent 
value but also to came to their aid when they 
are threatened by other moral agents. Rights 
are not absolute but may be overridden in 
certain circumstances. Just what these cir-
cumstances are we will consider later. But 
first, let's look at some difficulties in the 
theory as thus far presented. 
In the second stage, Regan argues that 
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The Mystery of Inherent Value 
Inherent value is a key concept in Re-
gan's theory. It is the bridge between the 
plausible claim that all nonnal, mature mam-
mals--human or otherwise--are subjects-of-a-
life and the more debatable claim that they 
all have basic moral rights of the same 
strength. But it is a highly obscure con-
cept, and its obscurity makes it ill-suited 
to play this crucial role. 
Inherent value is defined almost entire-
ly in negative tenns. It is not dependent 
upon the value which either the inherently 
valuable individual or anyone else may place 
upon that individual's life or experiences. 
It is not (necessarily) a function of sen-
tience or any other mental capacity, because, 
Regan says, some entities which are not sen-
tient (e.g., trees, rivers, or rocks) may, 
nevertheless, have inherent value (p. 246). 
It cannot attach to anything other than an 
individual; species, eco-systems, and the 
like cannot have inherent value. 
These are sane of the things which in-
herent value is not. But what is it? Unfor-
tunately, we are not told. Inherent value 
appears as a mysterious non-natural property 
which we must take on faith. Regan says that 
it is a postulate that subjects-of-a-life 
have inherent value, a postulate justified by 
the fact that it avoids certain absurdities 
which he thinks follow fran a purely utili-
tarian theory (p. 247). But why is the pos-
tulate that subjects-of-a-life have inherent 
value? If the inherent value of a being is 
canpletely independent of the value that it 
or anyone else places upon its experiences, 
then why does the fact that it has certain 
sorts of experiences constitute evidence that 
it has inherent value? If the reason is that 
subjects-of-a-life have an existence which 
can go better or worse for them, then why 
isn't the appropriate conclusion that all 
sentient beings have inherent value, since 
they would all seem to meet that condition? 
Sentient but mentally unsoIilisticated beings 
may have a less extensive range of possible 
satisfactions and frustrations, but why 
should it follow that they have--or may have 
-no inherent value at all? 
In the absence of a positive account of 
inherent value, it is also difficult to grasp 
the connection between being inherently valu-
able and having moral rights. Intuitively, 
it seems that value is one thing, and rights 
are another. It does not seem incoherent to 
say that sane things (e.g., mountains, ri-
vers, redwood trees) are inherently valuable 
and yet are not the sorts of things which can 
have moral rights. Nor does it seem incoher-
ent to ascribe inherent value to sane things 
which are not individuals, e.g., plant or 
animal species, though it may well be inco-
herent to ascribe moral rights-- to such 
things. 
In short, the concept of inherent value 
seems to create at least as many problems as 
it solves. If inherent value is based on 
sane natural property, then why not try to 
identify that property and explain its moral 
significance, without appealing to inherent 
value? And if it is not based on any natural 
property, then why should we believe in it? 
That it may enable us to avoid sane of the 
problems faced by the utilitarian is not a 
sufficient reason, if it creates other prob-
lems which are just as serious. 
Is There a Sharp Line? 
Perhaps the most serious problems are 
those that arise when we try to apply the 
strong animal rights position to animals 
other than nonnal, mature marmnals. Regan's 
theory requires us to divide all living 
things into two categories: those which have 
. the same inherent value and the same basic 
rroral rights that we do, and those which have 
no inherent value and presumably no rroral 
rights. But wherever we try to draw the 
line, such a sharp division is implausible. 
It would surely be arbitrary. to draw 
such a sharp line between normal, mature 
marrmals and all other living things. Sane 
birds .(e. g ., crows, magpies, parrots, mynahs) 
appear to be just as mentally sopusticated 
as most mammals and thus are equally strong 
candidates for inclusion under the subject-
of-a-life criterion. Regan is not in fact 
advocating that we draw the line here. His 
claim is only that normal, mature mammals are 
clear cases, while other cases are less 
clear. Yet, on his theory, there must be 
such a sharp line somewhere, since there are 
no degrees of inherent value. But why should 
we believe that there is a sharp line between 
creatures that are subjects-of-a-life and 
creatures that are not? Isn't it more likely 
that "subjecthood" comes in degrees, that 
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sane creatures have only a little self-aware-
ness, and only a little capacity to antici-
pate the future, while sane have a little 
rrore, and some a go::xl deal more? 
Should we, for instance, regard fish, 
amphibians, and reptiles as subjects-of-a-
life? A simple yes-or-no answer seems inade-
quate. On the one hand, sane of their behav-
ior is difficult to explain without the as-
sumption that they have sensations, beliefs, 
desires, emotions, and memories; on the other 
hand, they do not seem to exhibit very much 
self-awareness or very much conscious antici-
pation of future events. Do they have enough 
mental sophistication to count as subjects-
of-a-life? Exactly how much is enough? 
It is still more unclear what we should 
say about insects, spiders, octopi, and other 
invertebrate animals which have brains and 
sensory organs but whose minds (if they have 
minds) are even more alien to us than those 
of fish or reptiles. Such creatures are 
probably sentient. some people doubt that 
they can feel pain, since they lack certain 
neurological structures which are crucial to 
the processing of pain impJ.1ses in vertebrate 
animals. But this argument is inconclusive, 
since their nervous systems might process 
pain in ways different fran ours. When in-
jured, they sanetimes act as if they are in 
pain. On evolutionary grounds, it seems 
unlikely that highly mobile creatures with 
complex sensory systems would not have devel-
oped a capacity for pain (and pleasure), 
since such a capacity has obvious survival 
value. It must, however, be admitted that we 
do not know whether spiders can feel pain (or 
something very like it), let alone whether 
they have emotions, memories, beliefs, de-
sires, self-awareness, or a sense of the 
future. 
Even more mysterious are the mental 
capacities (if any) of mobile microfauna. 
The brisk and efficient way that paramecia 
move about in their incessant search for fo::xl 
might indicate sane kind of sentience, in 
spite of their lack of eyes, ears, brains, 
and other organs associated with sentience in 
!!Ore complex organisms. It is conceivable--
though not very probable--that they, too, are 
subjects-of-a-life. 
The existence of a few unclear cases 
need not pose a serious problem for a !!Oral 
theory, but in this case, the unclear cases 
constitute !!Ost of those with which an ade-
quate theory of animal rights would need to 
deal. The subject-of-a-life criterion can 
provide us with little or no moral guidance 
in our interactions with the vast majority of 
animals. That might be acceptable if it 
could be supplemented with addilional princi-
ples which would provide such guidance. How-
ever, the radical dualism of the theory pre-
cludes supplementing it in this way. We are 
forced to say that either a spider has the 
same right to life as you and I do, or it has 
no right to life whatever-and that only the 
gods know which of these alternatives is 
true. 
Regan I S suggestion for dealing with such 
unclear cases is to apply the "benefit of the 
doubt" principle. That is, when dealing with 
beings that mayor may not not be subjects-
of-a-life, we should act as if they are. [6] 
But if we try to apply this principle to the 
entire range of doubtful cases, we will find 
ourselves with !!Oral obligations which we 
cannot possibly fulfill. In many climates, 
it is virtually impossible to live without 
swatting mosquitoes and exterminating cock-
roaches, and not all of us can afford to hire 
saneone to sweep the path before we walk, in 
order to make sure that we do not step on 
ants. Thus, we are still faced with the 
daunting task of drawing a sharp line sane-
where on the continuum of life forms--this 
time, a line demarcating the limits of the 
benefit of the doubt principle. 
The weak. animal rights theory provides a 
more plausible way of dealing with this range 
of cases, in that it allows the rights of 
animals of different kinds to vary in 
strength. A creature I s probable degree of 
mental sophistication may be relevant to the 
strength of its moral rights, because mental-
ly sophisticated creatures are apt to be 
capable of greater suffering and probably 
lose more which is of potential value to them 
when they lose their lives. [7] The degree of 
uncertainty about whether a creature is sen-
tient at all is also relevant: whether and 
in what way we ought to apply the benefit of 
the doubt principle depends in part upon how 
much doubt there is. (For instance, it is 
possible that plants are sentient, but it is 
so unlikely that we are surely not morally 
obligated to act as though they are.) Thus, 
we may follow CClllUlOn sense in saying that to 
kill a spider just for fun is not as objec-
tionable as to kill a bird or a mamnal just 
for fun, but it is wrong, nevertheless. No 
sentient being should be killed except for 
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same good reason, and sport or aIlUlSement are 
not good reasons. 
Ki II ing Rodents 
Now let's look at the implications of 
the strong animal rights position for our 
treatment of marrmals. I agree with many of 
the conclusions which Regan draws, e.g., that 
the oonditions under which animals are kept 
in same factory farms are deplorable and that 
there is no excuse for most of the painful 
experiments performed on animals in the name 
of science. [8] However, I doubt that we 
oould--or should--live with a prohibition 
against killing non-human mamnals as strong 
as that which he advocates. 
Consider, for instance, the killing of 
mice and rats in order to protect food sup-
plies and prevent the spread of disease. 
Most towns and cities would become uninhabit-
able (by humans) if rodents were not trapped, 
poisoned, or killed by cats or other small 
predators kept for that purpose. It is sane-
times feasible to live-trap rodents and re-
lease them unhanned, but this method has 
drawbacks. If one lives in a city, there may 
be no nearby place where they can be released 
without causing a problem for saneone else. 
As I have discovered, live-trapping can be 
rrore inhumane than the use of lethal traps, 
because if two or more animals are caught in 
the same trap, they may tear each other a-
part. Yet, on the strong animal rights posi-
tion, it would be wrong to use lethal traps. 
This strikes me as an unacceptable oonclu-
sion. 
One response to this objection might be 
that killing mice and rats is acceptable 
because rrost of the animals that are killed 
are probably under a year of age (since such 
creatures tend to have short lifespans). But 
this would be a weak response, not only be-
cause sane are over a year of age but, rrore 
to the point, because such animals tend to 
reach rhysical and mental maturity at well 
under that age. It might also be suggested 
that mice and rats are not subjects-of-a-
life. However, I know of no reason to be-
lieve that they are any less mentally sorhis-
ticated than rrost other marrrnals. 
A rrore serious response would be that we 
are justified in killing rodents because they 
threaten our well-being. To be oonsistent 
with the strong animal rights position, it 
would be necessary to claim that rodents 
represent a threat of such magnitude as would 
also justify killing people, were they to 
threaten us in the same ways. But I do not 
think that this line of argument can be sus-
tained. 
Regan holds that the right of a subject-
of-a-life not to be hanned may justly be 
overridden in four types of cases. These 
are: (1) self-defense by the innocent, (2) 
punishment of the guilty, (3) cases in which 
innocent individuals are used as "shields" to 
protect those engaged in wrongful activities, 
and (4) cases in which innocent individuals 
pose a threat to other innocent individuals. 
Conditions (2) and (3) obviously do not apply 
in the present case. Killing mice is not a 
case of self-defense against a ~ attack-
er, because mice are rroral patients and can-
not be held responsible for the threat they 
pose. Perhaps, though, they may justly be 
killed as innocent threats. One has a right 
to defend oneself even against rroral pa-
tients, who cannot be blamed for the threat 
they pose. 
The problem with this argument is that 
we would not and should not oondone killing 
people--especially innocent ones--in order to 
protect health or property. In the unlikely 
event that human children were to invade our 
houses, eating our food, making holes in the 
walls, and spreading diseases, we would not 
be justified in killing them. How, then, can 
we be justified in killing mice under the 
same circumstances, if all manrnals have the 
same basic moral rights? 
Arguments about the morality of killing 
mice may strike the reader as trivial. If 
so, remember that it is the strong animal 
rights claim which forces us to !Ake them 
seriously. If that claim is true, then to 
set a lethal rrouse trap is to ccmnit the 
rroral equivalent of hanicide. 
Ecologically Motivated Killing 
The strong animal rights position is 
also incompatible with our right--indeed, 
perhaps our obligation--to protect the natur-
al world fram unnecessary harm due to human 
intervention. Sane critics have argued that 
it would even require us to inflict further 
harm, by seeking, wherever possible, to eli-
minate natural predation in order to protect 
prey animals. Such a project would be eoolo-
gically destructive in the extreme. I think 
that there is sane force in this objection to 
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the strong animal rights position. [9] How-
ever, I will not discuss it here, because it 
has been extensively dealt with by other 
writers, such as J. Baird callicott, [10] Mark 
sagoff, [11] Alistair Gunn, [12::': Dale Jamie-
san,[13] and Steve Sapontzis.[14] Instead, I 
will focus on cases in which it is impossible 
to protect animal pop..11ations, species, or 
habitats without killing some animals. In 
making this argument, I do not wish to imply 
that killing animals is the most important 
way of protecting species or habitats. But 
there are sane cases in which it is necessa-
ry, if ecological disaster is to be avoided. 
One such class of cases is those in 
which pop..11ations of herbivores must be 
culled-Le., sane of the, animals killed--in 
order to alleviate overpop..11ation. In the 
absence of sufficient natural predation, some 
species (e.g., deer and rabbits) can become 
too numerous, and their overcropping can 
permanently damage the land by making it 
vulnerable to erosion or causing the local 
extinction of plant or animal species. More-
over, many animals may die of starvation or 
disease if their numbers are not reduced. 
This is a cornm:>n defense of hl.Ulting, and I 
think it is sometimes a valid one. Granted, 
it is usually because of prior human inter-
vention that there are now too few natural 
predators, but I do not think that this eli-
minates· our obligation to prevent further 
environmental damage or unnecessary animal 
suffering; if anything, it increases it. It 
would be better for the health of the prey 
species to bring back the natural predators, 
who do a better job of eliminating sick or 
abnonnal animals than human hl.Ulters usually 
do. But this is often impossible, at least 
in the short run. 
The strong animal right.s position pro-
hibits culling animal pop..11ations for either 
environmental or humane reasons. Regan re-
gards the killing of individual animals for 
environmental reasons as a form of fascism 
(p. 362). He would permit hl.Ulting to prevent 
animal starvation only if we could be certain 
that all of the deaths due to hl.Ulting would 
be less miserable than those caused by star-
vation, and we cannot be sure of this, since 
it is more or less inevitable that sane ani-
mals will be wounded and left to die slowly 
(p. 354). P0p..11ation control through contra-
ception or sterilization of animals would 
presUffi3.bly be permissible and might be possi-
ble with sane of the larger herbivores, but 
it would probably be impossible in the case 
of smaller and more numerous ohes, such as 
rabbits. It seems, then, that we have no 
option but to let the rabbits multiply I.Ultil 
the last blade of grass is gone. 
On the weak animal rights position, we 
need not accept this oonclusion. This ap-
proach permits us to argue that our obliga-
tion is not only to protect individual animal 
lives but, more importantly, to protect the 
environments in which animals can lead lives 
natural to their kind. A life without preda-
tion is not natural for prey species, and it 
is no favor to them to provide them such a 
life if the result is greater suffering for 
them and permanent damage to the resources on 
which they depend. In the long run, we 
should try to reintroduce natural predators 
wherever possible. In the short run, hl.Ulting 
is essential in sane areas. (Because we 
cannot trust the amateur hl.Ulter to kill 
cleanly and to kill only animals of species 
which are overpop..11ous, it is best to employ 
professional hl.Ulters when possible.) 
Another set of cases which tell against 
the strong animal rights theory are those in 
which native animal or plant populations are 
threatened by introduced animals. To cite 
just one example, throughout Australia feral 
cats and introduced foxes are decimating many 
species of small marsupials and birds. Na-
tural predation does not harm prey species; 
it is a symbiotic relationship in which both 
species normally thrive. But predation by 
introduced species is another matter. The 
small birds and marsupials of Australia have 
evolved in the absence of any natural preda-
tors similar to cats or foxes and are without 
defense against these extremely efficient 
predators. Canpetition fran introduced pre-
dators has contributed to the decline of the 
less efficient native predators, such as the 
marsupial cats, tuans, andkoweris. Some 
species are already extinct, in part as a 
result of this unnatural predation. Agricul-
tural practices, such as the too-frequent 
burning of scrub and clearing of woodlands 
for grazing, have alsa been detrimental to 
many native species. A great deal of habitat 
has been lost, perhaps permanently. But most 
oonservationists believe that sane extinc-
tions can be prevented by killing introduced 
predators whenever possible. 
On the strong animal rights position, 
killing introduced predators in order to save 
native species fran extinction is wrong. It 
would surely be wrong to kill human irrmi-
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grants in order to protect native fauna, and 
(on Regan' s theory) this case is not signifi-
ca..'1tly different. Regan says that the fact 
that an animal is a member of an endangered 
species does not confer any additional rooral 
rights upon it (p. 359) • This may be true, 
and it may also be true that the fact that an 
animal is an introduced predator does not 
~ any of its rooral rights. But in si-
tuations of this kind, the rights of indivi-
dual animals are only one of a number of 
roorally relevant considerations. 
Explaining the rooral basis for the obli-
gation to prevent the extinction of plant or 
animal species is an enonrous task, and one 
which I cannot undertake here. It is diffi-
cult not because there are no good reasons to 
object to extinctions but because there are 
so many, none of them individually overwhelm-
ing. Species often have instrumental (e.g., 
economic, scientific, recreational) value, 
but that is not the only reason for protect-
ing them. It seems to me that if there is 
anything which has inherent value, then plant 
and animal species are am::mg the things which 
have such value. I regard the beauty, charm, 
uniqueness, and irreplaceability of the Aus-
tralian birds and small marsupials as reasons 
for regarding them as inherently valuable. 
It would be misleading to construe such rea-
sons for valuing species as merely instrumen-
tal, because these are reasons for valuing 
them for what they are and not just for sane 
use we may hope to make of them. I want 
there to be orange-bellied parrots, noisy 
scrub birds, honey possums, bush-tailed bet-
tongs, bandicoots, hare wallabies, rat kanga-
roos, wanbats, wuhl wuhls, Olwbats, marsupial 
cats, sugar gliders, and quokkas in the Aus-
tralian bush, even though it is highly un-
likely that any of them will ever be instru-
mentally valuable to me or mine. 
There is also a question of justice-or 
sanething analogous to justice-here. Jus-
tice is not just a matter of how we treat 
individuals. Genocide is an injustice over 
and above injustices to human individuals. 
When a human tribe or culture perishes, it is 
not just individuals who may die but an irre-
placeable form of life which has been created 
over many generations. This is part of what 
makes genocide a crime against humanity, not 
just a crime against individuals. The des-
truction of an animal species is wrong in 
sanething like the way that genocide is 
wrong. Australia belonged to its native 
fauna for millions of years before it be-
longed to any human being. Fifty thousand 
years of occupation. by aboriginal people did 
little to reduce the richness of its flora 
and fauna and may even have enhanced it. [15] 
But European settlers, in two hundred years, 
have eradicated dozens of species and plShed 
many others to the edge of extinction. This 
is, arguably, an injustice, and I think it 
would be a further injustice not to try save 
those species which remain. The weak animal 
rights position permits us to do this. 
Why Are Animal Rights Weaker 
Than Human Rights? 
How can we justify regarding the rights 
of persons as generally stronger than those 
of sentient beings which are not persons? 
There are a plethora of bad. justifications., 
based on religious premises or false or un-
provable claims about the differences between 
human and non-human nature. But there is one 
difference which has a clear rooral relevance: 
people are at least sanetimes capable of 
being IlOved to action or inaction by the 
force of reasoned argument. Rationality 
rests upon other mental capacities, notably 
those which Regan cites as criteria for being 
a subject-of-a-life. We share these capaci-
ties with many other animals. But it is not 
just because we are subjects-of-a-life that 
we are both able and roorally ccrnpelled to 
reoognize one another as beings with equal 
basic IlOral rights. It is also because we 
are able to "listen to reason" in order to 
settle our conflicts and cooperate in shared 
projects. This capacity, unlike the others, 
may require sanething like a human language. 
Why is rationality roorally relevant? It 
does not make us "better" than other animals 
or IlOre "perfect." It does not even automa-
tically make us IOOre intelligent. (Bad rea-
soning reduces our effective intelligence 
rather than increasing it.) But it is rooral-
ly relevant insofar as it provides greater 
possibilities for cooperation and for the 
nonviolent resolution of problems. It also 
makes us IlOre dangerous than non-rational 
beings can ever be. Because we are poten-
tially roore dangerous and less predictable 
than wolves, we need an articulated system of 
roorality to regulate our conduct. Any human 
roorality, to be workable in the long run, 
must recognize the equal rroral status of all 
persons, whether through the postulate of 
equal basic rooral rights or in sane other 
way. The reoognition of the IlOral equality 
of other persons is the price we must each 
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pay for their re<XJgIlition of our moral equal-
ity. Without this mutual re<XJgIlition of 
rroral equality, human society can exist only 
in a state of chronic and bitter conflict. 
The war between the sexes will persist so 
long as there is sexism and male domination; 
racial conflict will never be eliminated so 
long as there are racist laws and practices. 
But, to the extent that we achieve a mutual 
re<XJgIlition of equality, we can hope to live 
together, perhaps as peacefully as welves, 
achieving (in part) through explicit rroral 
principles what they do not seem to need 
explicit moral principles to achieve. 
Why not extend this re<XJgIlition of moral 
equality to other creatures, even though they 
cannot do the same for us? The answer is 
that we cannot. Because we cannot reason 
with most non-human animals, we cannot ahlays 
solve the problems which they may cause with-
out harming them--although we are always 
obligated to try. We cannot negotiate a 
treaty with the feral cats and foxes, requir-
ing them to stop preying on endangered native 
species in return for suitable concessions on 
our part. 
If rats invade our houses. •• we 
cannot reason with them, hoping to 
persuade them of the injustice they 
do us. We can only attempt to get 
rid of them. [16 ] 
Aristotle was not wrong in claiming that 
the C9-pacity to alter one's behavior on the 
basis of reasoned argument is relevant to the 
full rroral status which he accorded to free 
men. Of course, he was wrong in his other 
premise, that wanen and slaves by their na-
ture cannot reason well enough to function as 
autonorrous rroral agents. Had that premise 
been true, so would his conclusion that warren 
and slaves are not quite the moral equals of 
free men. In the case of rrost non-human 
animals, the corresPonding premise is true. 
If, on the other hand, there are animals with 
whcm we can (learn to) reason, then we are 
obligated to do this and to regard them as 
our moral equals. 
Thus, to distinguish between the rights 
of persons and those of most other animals on 
the grounds that only people can alter their 
behavior on the basis of reasoned argument 
does not canmit us to a perfectionist theory 
of the sort Aristotle endorsed. There is no 
excuse for refusing to recognize the moral 
equality of sane people on the grounds that 
we don't regard them as quite as rational as 
we are, since it is perfectly clear that rrost 
people can reason well enough to determine 
how to act so as to respect the basic rights 
of others (if they choose to), and that is 
enough for rroral equality. 
But what about people who are clearly 
not rational? It is often argued that so-
J;histicated mental capacities such as ration-
ality cannot be essential for the possession 
of equal basic moral rights, since nearly 
everyone agrees that human infants and men-
tally incompetent persons have such rights, 
even though they may lack those soJ;histicated 
mental capacities. But this argument is 
inoonclusive, because there are p:JWerful 
practical and errotional reasons for protect-
ing non-rational human beings, reasons which 
are absent in the case of rrost non-human 
animals. Infancy and mental incampetence are 
human conditions which all of us either have 
experienced or are likely to experience at 
scme time. W3· also protect babies and men-
tally incampetent people because we care for 
them. We don't normally care for animals in 
the same way, and when we do-e.g., in the 
case of much-loved pets--we may regard them 
as having special rights by virtue of their 
relationship to us. We protect them not only 
for their sake but also for our own, lest we 
be hurt by harm done to them. Regan holds 
that such "side-effects" are irrelevant to 
rroral rights, and perhaps they are. But in 
ordinary usage, there is no sharp line be-
tween rroral rights and those moral protec-
tions which are not rights. The extension of 
strong rroral protections to infants and the 
mentally impaired in no way proves that non-
human animals have the same basic rroral 
rights as people. 
Why Speak of "Animal Rights" at All? 
If, as I have argued, reality precludes 
our treating all animals as our moral equals, 
then why should we still ascribe rights to 
. them? Everyone agrees that animals are enti-
tled to scme protection against human abuse, 
but why speak of animal rights if we are not 
prepared to accept most animals as our moral 
equals? The weak animal rights position may. 
seem an unstable ccmpranise between the bold 
claim that animals have the same basic moral 
rights that we do and the more camm::m view 
that animals have no rights at all. 
It is probably iIllfXJssible to either 
prove or disprove the thesis that animals 
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have m::>ral rights by producing an analysis of 
the concept of a m::>ral right and checking to 
see if sane or all animals satisfy the condi-
tions for having rights. The concept of a 
moral right is canplex, and it is not clear 
which of its strands are essential. Paradigm 
rights holders, i.e., mature and mentally 
oompetent persons, are both rational and 
morally autonOllDus beings and sentient sub-
jects-of-a-life. Opponents of animal rights 
claim that rationality and m::>ral autoncmy are 
essential for the possession of rights, while 
defenders of anirral rights claim that they 
are not. The ordinary concept of a m::>ral 
right is probably not precise enough to en-
able us to determine who is right on purely 
definitional grounds. 
If logical analysis will not answer the 
question of whether animals have m::>ral 
rights, practical considerations may, never-
theless, incline us to say that they do. Th,e 
IJDst plausible alternative to the view that 
anirrals have IJDral rights is that, while they 
do not have rights, we are, nevertheless, 
obligated not to be cruel to them. Regan 
argues persuasively that the injunction to 
avoid being cruel to animals is inadequate to 
express our obligations towards animals, 
because it focuses on the mental states of 
those who cause anirral suffering, rather than 
on the harm done to the animals themselves 
(p. 158) • Cruelty is inflicting pain or 
suffering and either taking pleasure in that 
pain or suffering or being m::>re or less in-
different to it. Thus, to express the demand 
for the decent treatment of anirrals in terms 
of the rejection of cruelty is to invite th,e 
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too easy response that those who subject 
animals to suffering are not being cruel 
because they regret the suffering they cause 
but sincerely believe that what they do is 
justified. The injunction to avoid cruelty 
is also inadequate in that it does not pre-
clude the killing of animals-for any reason, 
however trivial--so long as it is done rela-
tively painlessly. 
The inadequacy of the anti-cruelty view 
provides one practical reason for speaking of 
animal rights. Another practical reason is 
that this is an age in which nearly all 
significant m::>ral claims tend to be expressed 
in terms of rights. Thus, the denial that 
ani.rnals have rights, however carefully quali-
fied, is likely to be taken to mean that we 
may do whatever we like to them, provided 
that we do not violate any human rights. In 
such a oontext, speaking of the rights of 
anirrals may be the only way to persuade many 
people to take seriously protests against the 
abuse of animals. 
Why not extend this line of argument and 
speak of the rights of trees, m::>untains, 
oceans, or anything else which we may wish to 
see protected fran destruction? Sane envi-
ronmentalists have not hesitated to speak in 
this way, and, given the importance of pro-
tecting such elements of the natural world, 
they cannot be blamed for using this rhetori-
cal device. But, I would argue that IJDral 
rights can meaningfully be ascribed only to 
entities ·which have sane capacity for sen-
tience. This is because m::>ral rights are 
protections designed to protect rights hol-
ders from hanns or to provide them with bene-
fits which matter to them. Only beings cap-
able of sentience can be harmed or benefitted 
in ways which matter to them, for only such 
beings can like or dislike what happens to 
them or prefer sane oonditions to others. 
Thus, sentient animals, unlike m::>untains, 
rivers, or species, are at least logically 
possible candidates for moral rights. This 
fact, together with the need to end current 
abuses of anirrals-e.g., in scientific re-
search and intensive farming-provides a 
plausible case for speaking of animal rights. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that Regan •s case for 
ascribing strong moral rights to all normal, 
mature rnarmlals is unpersuasive because (1) it 
rests upon the obs=e concept of inherent 
value, wJrich is defined only in negative 
terms, and (2) it seems to preclude any plau-
sible answer to questions about the m::>ral 
status of the vast majority of sentient ani-
mals. Moreover, (3) the strong anirral rights 
position leads to unacceptable oonclusions: 
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e.g., that we may not kill rodents when they 
invade our houses or protect endangered spe-
cies by killing introduced predators. The 
weak aninal rights position allows for the 
necessary flexibility in dealing with animals 
when they pose a threat to our well-being, or 
that of other animals, or ecological systems. 
On the other hand, it also ascribes IOOral 
rights to a much wider range of animals: not 
just normal, mature mamnals but all sentient 
beings, whether warm- or cold-blooded, verte-
brate or invertebrate. 
The weak animal rights theory asserts 
that (1) any creature whose natural IOOde of 
life includes the pursuit of certain satis-
factions has the right not to be forced to 
exist without the opportunity to pursue those 
satisfactions; (2) that any creature which is 
capable of pain, suffering, or frustration 
has the right that such experiences not be 
deliberately inflicted upon it without sane 
compelling reason; and (3) that no sentient 
being should be killed without good reason. 
HOW'ever, IOOral rights are not an all-or-
nothing affair. The strength of the reasons 
required to override the rights of a non-
hum:m organism varies, depending upon-a.-oc>ng 
other things--the probability that it is 
sentient and (if it is clearly sentient) its 
probable degree of mental sophistication. In 
the words of A. M. MacIver, 
If I tread wantonly on a woodlouse, 
I do wrong. ••• But it is only a 
very small wrong, and to exaggerate 
its wrongness is sentimentali-
ty. [17] 
The Editors thank 
THE HUMANE SOCIETY 
OF THE 
UNITED STATES 
for its generous contribution 
providing partial support during 1986 
Notes 
2. For instance, Peter Singer, although 
he does not like to speak of rights, includes 
all sentient beings under the protection of 
his basic utilitarian principle of equal 
respect for like interests. (Animal Libera-
tion (New York: Avon Books, 1975), p. 3.) 
3. The capacity for sentience, like all 
of the mental capacities mentioned in what 
follows, is a disposition. Dispositions do 
not disappear whenever they are not currently 
manifested. Thus, sleeping or temporarily 
unconscious persons or non-hum:m aninals are 
still sentient in the relevant sense (i.e., 
still capable of sentience), so long as they 
still have the neurological mechanisms neces-
sary for the occurrence of experiences. 
4. It is possible, perhaps probable 
that sane non-hum:m aninals--such as ceta-
ceans and anthropoid apes--should be regarded 
as persons. If so, then the weak animal 
rights position holds that these animals have 
the same basic IOOral rights as hum:m persons. 
5. See R. G. Frey, Interests and 
Rights: The Case Against Animals (OXford: 
OXford University Press, 1980). 
6. See, for instance, p. 319, where 
Regan appeals to the benefit of the doubt 
principle when dealing with infanticide and 
late-term abortion. 
7. Regan appears to admit the relevance 
of such considerations when he says that in 
the lifeboat case we should throw the dog 
overboard rather than one of the hum:m pas-
sengers, because death would be a lesser harm 
to the dog (p. 351) • HOW'ever, he does not 
think it follows that the dog's right to life 
is weaker than ours. 
8. Whether it is wrong to kill animals 
for food, when other foods are available, is 
a much IOOre difficult question and one which 
I cannot consider at length here. In brief, 
I do not think that we wrong aninals by 
raising them for food, provided that their 
lives and deaths are no worse than they prob-
ably would have been had they lived in the 
"wild. .. As we all know, contemporary methods 
of aninal husbandry often fail to meet this 
condition. 
1. Tan Regan, The Case for Animal 9. Regan's response to this objection 
Rights (Berkeley: University of California is that we are not obligated to defend deer 
Press, 1983). All page references are to fran wolves because wolves are not IOOral 
this edition. agents, and thus deer have no rights against 
BE:IWEEN THE SPOCIES 172 
--------
--------------
them (p. 357) • This resp:mse misses th'9 
p::>int, since the right to life of other per-
sons obligates us to defend them even agains"t 
threats fran things which are not rroral a'-
gents--e.g., famine and disease. 
10. J. Baird callicott, review of The 
case for Animal Rights, Envirornnental Ethics 
7 (1985), pp. 365-75. 
11. Mark Sagoff, "Animal Liberation and 
Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quidc 
Divorce," Osgood Hall Law Journal 22 (1984)" 
pp. 297-307. 
12. Alistair Gurm, "Traditional Ethics 
and the Moral Status of Animals," Envirorunen-
tal Ethics 5 (1982), pp. 133-53. 
13. Dale Jamieson, "Regan I s Theory of 
Rights: Two Problems," paper presented at 
the Pacific Division meeting of the American 
Philosophical Association, 1985. 
14. Steve F. Sapontzis, "Predation," 
Ethics ~ Animals 2 (1984), pp. 27-38. 
15. There is debate about whether thE! 
extinctions of a number of species of largE! 
marsupials, which occurred between fifty and 
fifteen thousand years ago, were due in part: 
to human hunting. In any case, there seem to 
have been few more recent extinctions, prior 
to the arrival of the Europeans. 
16. l3onr'1ie SteinJxx:k, "Speciesism and 
the Idea of FqualityI" Philosophy 53 (1978) , 
p. 253. 
17. A. M. MacIver, "Ethics and the 
Beetle," Analysis 8 (April, 1948), p. 65. 
Jim Flarter. Animals: 14-:g 
Coo~"--~~"':"-F'reeIIIi'lst~o:-:s. 
New YorK: Dover, 1919 
ANIMALS. 
Do they matter? 
An exciting new awareness is 
unfolding about our relationship 
with animals and the rest of the 
natural world. Read ahout it in 
THE ANIMALS' AGENDA. 
I DYES, SiJUl me 
up for THEI 
ANIMALS'I AGENDAI [J 1 yr. 515.00 
I [J 2 yrs. 527.50 
l_i 3 yrs. 537.50I 
I o Here's 52 - Send me a sample 
("OilY and more infonnationI 
I NAME _ 
I 
I ~lREET _ 
II CITY l'>'TATE_ZIP I 
I THE ANIMAl;S' AGENDA . I 
P.O. Box 5234. '\\estpon, CT Oh8Hl JL 
173 BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES 
